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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kenton Ian Wilcox appeals from the district court's order denying his petition for 
post-conviction relief. Mr. Wilcox's claim concerning the failure to file an appeal went to 
an evidentiary hearing, where the district court concluded that Mr. Wilcox was 
adequately consulted about filing an appeal, and that, assuming deficient performance, 
Mr. Wilcox could not establish prejudice. Because counsel never informed Mr. Wilcox 
that he had a right to appeal regardless of the counsel's opinion of the merits of the 
appeal, Mr. Wilcox asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2009, Mr. Wilcox was convicted by a jury of two counts of lewd conduct with a 
minor and one count of sexual abuse of a minor. (R., p.6.) No appeal was taken. 
(R., p.7.) Mr. Wilcox subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting 
several claims. (R., p.6.) One claim was that his attorney as ineffective for failing to file 
an appeal after being directed to do so. (R., p.8.) The district court set this claim over 
for an evidentiary hearing but summarily dismissed the remaining claims. (R., p.131.) 
Mr. Wilcox's trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing. He testified that he 
met with Mr. Wilcox and Mr. Wilcox's father after the conviction, where one of the two 
asked him about an appeal. (Tr., p.40, Ls.9-13.) He said his response was, "appeal 
what?" (Tr., p.40, Ls.16-17.) According to trial counsel, 
I explained what an appeal is what you do on an appeal. And that is 
you're looking for adverse rulings that were made either in pretrial motions 
to suppress or motions in limine, or adverse rulings that were made by the 
trial court during the trial as a matter of evidence. And I remembered 
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thinking, well, we didn't lose any motions so we didn't have any adverse 
rulings, either pretrial or during the trial, that I could remember that would 
give rise to any meritorious appeal at all and so I told him that. 
(Tr., p.40, L.17 - p.41, L.2.) He did not meet with Mr. Wilcox or discuss anything about 
an appeal after sentencing. (Tr., p.41, Ls.11-16.) He did not discuss the possibility of 
challenging a sentence on appeal because no sentence had been imposed, but he did 
inform Mr. Wilcox that, regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, "for every 200 appeals 
alleging insufficiency of the evidence, you might get one sent back, and so the cost of 
doing an appeal for something like that and the chances of being successful just didn't 
warrant doing anything." (Tr., p.42, Ls.5-9.) 
Counsel could not remember if he discussed the cost of doing an appeal, but 
generally, "I would charge for an appeal like that a minimum retainer of $5,000, and 
then it might be more depending upon what the Supreme Court makes me do." 
(Tr., p.42, Ls.15-18.) Counsel testified that he had a lot of clients who had come back 
and asked about appeals, and he usually told them that if they can qualify, they sl1ould 
go with the State Appellate Public Defender. (Tr., p.42, Ls.19-25.) However, counsel 
stated, "as far as I know, [Mr. Wilcox] owned two pieces of real estate here in town and 
would not have qualified for a State Appellate Public Defender." (Tr., p.43, Ls.5-8.) 
Counsel believed this discussion lasted approximately ten minutes and did not 
think that he was asked to file an appeal. (Tr., p.44, Ls.3-9.) Mr. Wilcox did not contact 
him after sentencing concerning an appeal, but they did discuss post-conviction relief. 
(Tr., p.44, L.22 - p.45, L.9.) He stated that had Mr. Wilcox specifically requested that 
an appeal be filed, he would have done it. (Tr., p.45, Ls.13-18.) 
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On cross-examination, counsel acknowledged that he knew from reading the 
presentence investigation report that Mr. Wilcox suffered from learning disabilities, but 
he did not notice this at trial. (Tr., p.47, Ls.15-21.) He also acknowledged that he 
believed Mr. Wilcox was confused about the process in the criminal court system. 
(Tr., p.49, Ls.5-15.) 
Regarding the meeting that occurred after trial, counsel "definitely" agreed that 
Mr. Wilcox was expressing an interest in filing an appeal. (Tr., p.51, L.23 - p.52, L.1.) 
Counsel also did not believe that he informed Mr. Wilcox that he had the right to file an 
appeal regardless of counsel's opinion regarding its merits. (Tr., p.53, Ls.10-14.) 
Mr. Wilcox's father, Ronald, also testified. He testified that while at the meeting, 
his son asked trial counsel if he could file an appeal, to which counsel replied, "no," and 
"there's nothing to appeal." (Tr., p.66, Ls.2-22.) He was disappointed in that response. 
(Tr., p.67, Ls.1-3.) After the meeting, he did not feel as though he could instruct counsel 
to file an appeal. (Tr., p.69, Ls.20-23.) 
Mr. Wilcox then testified. He testified that at the meeting, he asked counsel if it 
was possible to file an appeal, and counsel responded, "no," and "there's nothing to 
appeal." (Tr., p.76, Ls.16-22.) He did not believe that counsel explained that he could 
direct counsel to file an appeal regardless of counsel's opinion. (Tr., p.78, Ls.11-13.) 
He never spoke to counsel again regarding an appeal, because, "I believed his answer 
was final." (Tr., p.79, Ls.1-5.) 
The district court denied Mr. Wilcox's petition. In its findings of fact, the court 
found that trial counsel explained the appeal process to Mr. Wilcox and advised him that 
there were no adverse grounds for appeal. (R., p.167.) The court also found that trial 
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counsel stated that even if Mr. Wilcox had requested an appeal, the appeal would still 
require merit. (R., p.168.) Further, the court found that trial counsel did not tell 
Mr. Wilcox that he had a right to an appeal or that he could order counsel to file an 
appeal. (R., p.168.) However, the court found that the sentencing judge specifically 
told Mr. Wilcox that he had a right to appeal. (R., p.168.) 
The court held that trial counsel consulted adequately concerning an appeal, and 
therefore, Mr. Wilcox had not demonstrated deficient performance. (R., p.172.) 
Further, the court held that even if counsel had been deficient, Mr. Wilcox had failed to 
demonstrate prejudice because he could not show that he either expressed a desire to 
appeal or that there was a nonfrivolous ground on which to appeal. (R., p.173.) The 
court also held that Mr. Wilcox could not establish prejudice because he was specifically 
told he had a right to appeal by the trial judge. (R., p.173.) 
Mr. Wilcox appealed. (R., p.176.) He asserts that the district court erred by 
denying his petition because he established that counsel did not consult with him 
adequately concerning his appeal and he was prejudiced thereby. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when denied Mr. Wilcox's petition for post-conviction relief? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wilcox's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Wilcox asserts that he demonstrated both deficient performance and 
prejudice at the evidentiary hearing, and that the district court erred by denying his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
B. Standard Of Review And General Legal Standards For Post-Conviction Actions 
"An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in 
nature." Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 591 (Ct. App. 1993). As with any other civil 
litigant, a petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding must establish the factual 
allegations upon which a claim for relief is based by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Id. 
Upon review of a district court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief when 
an evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho appellate courts will not disturb the district 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
695, 700 (1999), citing I.R.C.P. 52(a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct. App.1990). 
When reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, the appellate court defers to the 
district court's factual findings supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of the relevant law to those facts. Id. The credibility of the witnesses, 
relative weight of the evidence, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are matters 
solely within the province of the trial court. Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 874 
(Ct. App. 2008). However, this Court reviews de nova whether the district court 
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correctly applied the pertinent legal standards to the facts as found. Dunlap v. State, 
141 Idaho 50, 56 (2004). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wilcox's Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief 
A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in violation of a petitioner's rights 
under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution may be properly brought 
in a petition seeking post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 
359 (Ct. App. 1994). An assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel is measured by 
the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Id. 
Under this test, the defendant must establish: first, that counsel tendered deficient 
performance, meaning that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness; and, second, that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Id. The 
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel extends to all critical stages, 
including a direct appeal. Id. at 359-360. The well-established test from Strickland 
applies to claims, "that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice 
of appeal." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000). 
"The decision whether to prosecute an appeal rests with the defendant." Mata, 
124 Idaho at 593. Idaho courts have repeatedly recognized that, "where a criminal 
defendant advises his attorney of his desire to appeal, and the attorney fails to take the 
necessary steps to file an appeal, such a defendant has been denied his constitutional 
right to the effective assistance of counsel at a critical stage." Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 
191, 194-195 (Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has, "long 
7 
held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions to file a notice of appeal acts in a 
manner that is professionally unreasonable." Roe, 528 U.S. at 477. 
Moreover, where trial counsel is presented with a request to file an appeal, and 
fails to do so, prejudice is also presumed for purposes of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. Roe, 528 U.S. at 483-484; Beasley, 126 Idaho at 360-362. 
In other words, the prejudice prong is satisfied by a showing of the loss of the 
opportunity to appeal itself - no additional showing of prejudice, such as the probability 
of success on appeal, is required. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 690, 691 
(Ct. App. 1995); Beasley, 126 Idaho at 362; Mata, 124 Idaho at 593; Ricca v. State, 124 
Idaho 894, 898 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The United States Supreme Court has also held that counsef has a constitutional 
imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal in certain circumstances: 
We ... hold that counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult 
with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) 
that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because 
there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular 
defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in 
appealing. In making this determination, courts must take into account all 
the information counsel knew or should have known. Although not 
determinative, a highly relevant factor in this inquiry will be whether 
the conviction follows a trial or a guilty plea, both because a guilty 
plea reduces the scope of potentially appealable issues and because 
such a plea may indicate that the defendant seeks an end to judicial 
proceedings. Even in cases when the defendant pleads guilty, the court 
must consider such factors as whether the defendant received the 
sentence bargained for as part of the plea and whether the plea expressly 
reserved or waived some or all appeal rights. Only by considering all 
relevant factors in a given case can a court properly determine whether a 
rational defendant would have desired an appeal or that the particular 
defendant sufficiently demonstrated to counsel an interest in an appeal. 
Roe, 528 U.S. at 480 (emphasis added). Notably, the Court stated: "We expect that 
courts evaluating the reasonableness of counsel's performance using this inquiry we 
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have described will find, in the vast majority of cases, that counsel had a duty to consult 
with the defendant about an appeal." Id. at 481 . 
As a preliminary matter, the district court appears to hold, at the end of its 
analysis of deficient performance, that Mr. Wilcox did not demonstrate to counsel that 
he was interested in appealing. (R., p.172.) This finding is not supported by 
substantial, competent evidence in the record, and is thus clearly erroneous. There is 
no dispute that Mr. Wilcox inquired about an appeal and that in response trial counsel 
informed him that he did not believe that an appeal had any merit. The fact that 
Mr. Wilcox inquired into an appeal, by itself, is sufficient to demonstrate that he was 
interested in appeal. The case of Pecone v. State, 135 Idaho 865 (Ct. App. 2001 ), is 
instructive. In Pecone, after the district court imposed sentence, the defendant asked 
his counsel, "are we going to do an appeal?" Id. at 869. Counsel did not recall his 
answer. Id. "Based upon these findings of fact alone," the Idaho Court of Appeals 
concluded, "as a matter of law, that Pecone reasonably demonstrated to his counsel 
that he was at least interested in appealing. Thus, counsel had a constitutionally 
imposed duty to consult with Pecone about an appeal." Id. Thus, by inquiring about an 
appeal with counsel, Mr. Wilcox reasonably demonstrated that he was interested in 
appealing and counsel had a constitutional duty to consult with Mr. Wilcox concerning 
his appeal. 
The consultation provided by Mr. Wilcox's trial counsel was not adequate. The 
district court specifically found that trial counsel did not inform Mr. Wilcox that he had a 
right to an appeal or than Mr. Wilcox could instruct his counsel to file an appeal. 
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(R., p.168.) Again, Pecone is instructive on this point. The Court of Appeals discussed 
this district court's findings regarding the consultation, which included, 
(1) Pecone and his counsel "discussed Pecone's appeal rights"; (2) 
counsel "advised Pecone that because he had pleaded guilty no issues 
remained for an appeal"; (3) "[a]fter sentencing, [trial counsel] discussed 
Pecone's post conviction rights with him, including the right to appeal. He 
discussed Pecone's right to seek leniency, and told him he would be 
unsuccessful on appeal"; and (4) "Pecone and [trial counsel] had ample 
opportunities after sentencing to resume any discussion of Pecone's 
appellate rights. Pecone never asked again about an appeal." The district 
court thereafter concluded that Pecone's trial counsel "consulted-albeit 
quickly-with Pecone about an appeal, and outlined the bases for 
discouraging an appeal in this case." 
Id. Based on these findings of fact, the Court of Appeals concluded that counsel 
satisified his duty to consult with his client. Id. at 870. The consultation that Pecone 
received was very different than what Mr. Wilcox received, in that Mr. Pecone was 
advised that he a right to appeal. This case is very different - Mr. Wilcox was never 
informed by his attorney of the fact that he had a right to appeal, that he could direct 
counsel to file an appeal, and that he was entitled to counsel on appeal if he could not 
afford an appeal. Because Mr. Wilcox was not informed of critical constitutionally 
required information - that he had a right to appeal regardless of whether counsel felt 
an appeal had merit, Mr. Wilcox asserts that he demonstrated, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that counsel's performance was deficient. 
Further, Mr. Wilcox asserts that he demonstrated prejudice. "When counsel's 
constitutionally deficient performance deprives a petitioner of an appeal that he 
otherwise would have taken, the petitioner has made out a successful ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal." Id. at 484. "Accordingly, we 
hold that, to show prejudice in these circumstances, a defendant must demonstrate that 
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there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with 
him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed." Id. 
Citing to Roe, the district court held, "to display prejudice the petitioner could 
show either that he expressed a desire to appeal or that there was a nonfrivolous 
ground on which to appeal," and that Mr. Wilcox had not demonstrated either. 
(R., p.173.) However, Mr. Wilcox was certainly not required to identify a meritorious 
ground for appeal. "Although showing nonfrivolous grounds for appeal may give weight 
to the contention that the defendant would have appealed, a defendant's inability to 
'specify the points he would raise were his right to appeal reinstated' will not foreclose 
the possibility that he can satisfy the prejudice requirement where there are other 
substantial reasons to believe that he would have appealed. Roe, 528 U.S. at 486 
(citation omitted). "Rather, we require the defendant to demonstrate that, but for 
counsel's deficient conduct, he would have appealed." Id. 
As set forth above, Mr. Wilcox clearly demonstrated that he expressed an 
interest in appealing to his attorney. Further, Mr. Wilcox asserts that he has 
demonstrated that he would have appealed but for counsel's failure to adequately 
consult with him about an appeal. Mr. Wilcox testified that he never brought up the 
appeal issue because he was left with the impression that counsel's answer was final. 
(Tr., p.79, Ls.1-5; p. 81, Ls.1-4.) When asked if he wanted to appeal, Mr. Wilcox 
responded, "I wanted something to happen," indicating that he did wish to appeal. 
(Tr., p.81, Ls.5-6.) 
Finally, the district court held that Mr. Wilcox, "was specifically told he had a right 
to appeal by the trial judge." (R., p.173.) This factual finding is clearly erroneous. The 
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trial court said the following: "You are also nohAed that you have 42 days to appeal this 
sentence. You would have the services of the public defender available to you if you 
can't afford Mr. Nelson's services for any appeal." (4/10/09 Tr., p.81, Ls.15-19.) 
Mr. Wilcox was not told that he had a right to appeal - he was simply informed of the 
time limit for appealing and that he could possibly have the services of the public 
defender. Further, the court only informed him that he could appeal his sentence, and 
Mr. Wilcox expressed a desire to appeal his conviction, as the conversation he had with 
counsel took place before the sentencing hearing. 
Mr. Wilcox asserts that he demonstrated that he would have appealed but for 
counsel's failure to advise him that he had a right to appeal regardless of whether 
counsel believed an appeal would have had merit. Further, counsel's deficient 
performance was not cured by the trial judge informing Mr. Wilcox of the time limit for 
filing an appeal. The district court erred in concluding that Mr. Wilcox had not 
demonstrated prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wilcox respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
denying his petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 13th day of January, 2012. 
'>, _£_~:·\, 0:~~= -
~< -·~:-~ I(~// 
JUSTIN M'>CURTIS , 
Deputy\~tat~·iAppellate Public Defender 
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